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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10373/592

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Title: The credit crisis and corporate governance : excessive bonuses of TARP banks
Authors: Guidi, Marco G.D.
Kouhy, Reza
Affiliation: University of Abertay Dundee. Dundee Business School
University of Abertay Dundee. Dundee Business School
Keywords: TARP banks
Trouble asset relief programme
Banking
Excessive bonuses
Compulsory lay-offs
Rights redistribution
Moral debt
Corporate governance
Credit crisis
Bonus payments
Executive bonuses
Value to society
Issue Date: 2009
Publisher: Inderscience
Type: Journal Article
Refereed: peer-reviewed
Rights: Published version (c)Inderscience, available from http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1504/IJCG.2009.032725
Citation: Guidi, M.G.D. and Kouhy, R. 2009. The credit crisis and corporate governance : excessive bonuses of TARP banks. International Journal of Corporate Governance. 1(4): pp.366-381. [Online] Available from http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1504/IJCG.2009.032725
Abstract: Maximising TARP banks' value to society would require the integration of all stakeholders rights and 'moral debt' (obligations) claims providing justice in protecting and distributing alienable and inalienable rights as well as their associated benefits and costs. For instance, the TARP banks that maximise their value only for an elite group through excessive bonus payments to executives incur 'moral debt' claims from other stakeholders, which will make the firm less valuable to society. This study shows that the unjust redistribution of rights through compulsory layoffs, whilst making excessive executive bonus payments reduces the value of TARP banks to society.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10373/592
ISSN: 1754-3037
Appears in Collections:Dundee Business School Collection

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